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COMMENTS
NLRB Discovery Practice: The Applicability of
the Discovery Provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure
Pretrial discovery generally serves two purposes: (1)to narrow and clarify the issues between the adverse parties, and (2) to
ascertain the facts relative to those issues and to produce information concerning the existence or location of relevant facts.l The
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2have
proven effective in serving these purposes in civil actions in the
federal district court^.^ In administrative adjudications, however,
discovery-type procedures have received a mixed response.' In
particular, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) has consistently opposed the adoption of discovery rules
for administrative adjudicatory proceedings authorized by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5 That policy has not
gone without challenge, however; NLRB Chairman Murphy, for
example, has suggested that full disclosure in accord with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be required of all parties in any
NLRB proceeding!
This comment examines NLRB discovery by reviewing the
present law of discovery in the collective bargaining context, by
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
2. These rules were first promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in 1938.
308 U.S. 645 (1939);FED.R. CIV.P. 86(a).Rules 26-37 are the general discovery provisions;
these provisions were amended substantially in 1970. 398 U.S. 977 (1970).
3. See Jenkins, Jenkins Proposals for Changes in NLRB Procedures, 45 L.R.R.M. 94,
101 (1960). For a discussion of the effectiveness of these federal discovery provisions, see
Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALEL.J. 1132 (1951);
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAW. L. REV.940 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Developments-Discovery] .
The federal discovery provisions have been lauded for assisting trial preparation,
minimizing the risk of surprise, reducing the number of controverted issues, and increasing the possibility of pretrial settlements. At the same time, discovery has been sharply
criticized for imposing disproportionate burdens of cost and inconvenience on the parties,
encroaching upon personal or professional privileges, allowing harassment, fostering
delay, and inducing injudicious settlements. Id. at 942.
4. See notes 81-94 and accompanying text infra.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970). The present NLRA consists primarily of the Wagner
Act, Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449, as amended by Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
6. Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB.L. REP. (1975-76 NLRB Dec.)
7 16,814, a t 27,771 n.7 (May 28, 1976) (dissenting opinion).
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discussing the arguments made by proponents and opponents of
adoption of discovery rules, and by analyzing the specific applicability of the federal rules' discovery provisions7to NLRB proceedings.
I. DISCOVERY
IN THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
CONTEXT
A.

The Need for Information

During collective bargaining and contract administration,
representatives of both labor and management frequently need
certain information that is possessed by the other party or the
NLRB. For example, in attempting to negotiate a favorable wageand-benefit package, a union may desire the results of an
'industry-wide wage survey made by an employer. Or, in order to
insure that all employees are included in an appropriate bargaining unit, a union may need a list of job descriptions or classifications of all employees. Conversely, an employer may desire union
records to verify whether a union's request that an employee be
discharged for being delinquent in payment of dues is justified.
An employer might also desire amplification of facts surrounding
an incident that resulted in an employee's grievance. In addition,
an employer or a union charged with an unfair labor practice may
need information known only by the NLRB or the charging party
in order to prepare a defense to the charge.
The need for information in the labor context can be classified as either subsidiary or primary. A need for data relevant and
necessary to a collateral dispute might be termed subsidiary. A
typical example is when the need for information arises during
the processing of a dispute through the grievance procedure; i.e.,
a union may seek information in the employer's possession relating to a union member for whom the union is pursuing a grievance. Also included in this category is the situation where the
respondent to an unfair labor practice complaint desires statements in the Board's possession that were made by potential
witnesses. The term primary might be used to characterize instances in which the need for information is the heart of the
dispute itself. For instance, a union may need certain economic
data in order to carry out its statutory obligation of effective
7. The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED.R. CN. P.
26-37, are herein referred to as the federal rules or the federal discovery rules.
8. This comment is limited to the discussion of unfair labor practice and related
proceedings. Other Board proceedings authorized by the NLRA, such as representation
and referendum procedures, are not treated.

8451

NLRB DISCOVERY PRACTICE

847

representation during bargaining. The employer's refusal to supply such information voluntarily may lead to an unfair labor
practice charge.

B. Present Practice, Law, and Doctrine
The need for information is a continuing and recurring one
in labor relations. Under existing practice generally, requested
information is freely exchanged?
Perhaps the information might not be supplied in quite the form
desired, but it [will] be disclosed nonetheless, to the satisfaction of the party seeking disclosure. Indeed, there are many
bargainers who, as a matter of policy, volunteer information
even before a request, once its relevance has become apparent.1°

This informal discovery often exists both where the basic dispute
has gone to arbitrationl1and where an unfair labor practice com9. Jones, Blind Man's Buff and the NOW-Problems of Apocrypha, Inc. and Local
711-Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargaining Disputes, 116 U. PA.L. REV.571, 586
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones I]. See also 0.FAIRWEATHER,
IN LABOR
ARBITRATION
122 (1973).
10. Jones I, supra note 9, a t 586. As Jones has stated:
Sometimes parties choose not to seek disclosure of relevant bargaining information. For example, there are some unions with no desire whatsoever to
inhibit their bargainers by embarrassing them with the facts of the particular
enterprise. As a bargaining gambit, they want no access to operational information other than that which is put on the bargaining table by the employer.
Similarly, a number of employers prefer to remain ignorant of the internal
affairs of unions representing their employees. The [NLRA] reinforces the
latter forbearance, by barring employer "interference" in the internal affairs of
unions. NLRA § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l)(1964). It is important to recognize, however, that many employers would have it no other way, both as a
matter of self-interest in effective bargaining and as a reflection of basic managerial philosophy, quite aside from the statutory policy.
Id. a t n.52.
Jones has also observed:
It is quite common for an arbitrator [or administrative law judge] to suggest, in the course of the morning['s arbitration or NLRB hearing], what we
might call, rhetorically, "lunchbreak discovery": "Why don't you dig that out
during the lunchbreak and make it available?" The parties general [sic] comply and disclosure is routine when the hearing resumes after luncheon.
Jones, The Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration-The Example of Arbitral
Discovery, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 830, 842 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones II]. For a
discussion of hearing-by-interval as a discovery substitute, see note 68 and accompanying
text infra.
supra
11. In arbitration, formal prehearing discovery is very limited. 0. FAIRWEATHER,
note 9, a t 121. Since arbitration is widespread (the current Bureau of National Affairs
sample analysis of 400 agreements reveals that 96 percent contain arbitration procedures,
[I9751 2 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
NEGOTIATIONS
& CONTRACTS
(BNA) 51:6), it is perhaps
surprising that discovery clauses are not found more frequently in collective bargaining
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plaint has been issued.12 Unfortunately, informal discovery has
not been satisfactory in every instance.
Formal discovery in NLRB adjudication is "stringently limited."13 With the issuance of the unfair labor practice complaint,
discovery issues involve three parties: the respondent, the chargagreements. See generally id. at 65:541-44.
In a trilogy of articles, Professor Edgar A. Jones, Jr. has discussed the recurrence of
discovery situations in labor relations, considered various aspects of arbitral discovery,
and proposed a model of effective court, NLRB, and arbitrator interaction to remedy the
need for disclosure. See Jones I, supra note 9; Jones II, supra note 10; Jones, The Labor
Board, the Courts, and Arbitration-A Feasibility Study of Tribunal Interaction in Grieuable Refusals to Disclose, 116 U. PA. L. REV.1185 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones IITJ.
Not all authorities favor arbitral discovery, however. See R. FLEMING,
THE LABOR
ARBITRATION
PROCESS
62-63 (1965). Labor arbitrators seem chary in ordering discovery,
supra
perhaps because of uncertainties in their authoritjl to do so. See 0.FAIRWEATHER,
note 9, at 125-31.
12. Although the choice between pursuing arbitration or filing an unfair labor practice charge, assuming the parties have this "andlor" option, may be influenced by a
number of factors, an aggrieved party usually charges unfair labor practices and thus seeks
to invoke an NLRB proceeding. This comment is based on the assumption that the parties
choose, when a choice exists, this NLRB route.
Arbitration clearly provides the faster adjudication of disputes over refusals to disON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE
&
close. See Jones I, supra note 9. See also SUBCOMM.
PROCEDURE,
SENATE
COMM.ON THE JUDICIARY,
8 % ~CONG.,2D SESS., EVALUATION
CHARTS
ON DELAY
IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
25, 41, 58, 70 (Comm. Print 1966); Jones III,
supra note 11, at 1244-59. The inherent delay in Board proceedings may lead to a loss of
the charging party's prestige and have serious economic consequences. On the other hand,
the charging party enlists the skills and resources of the General Counsel's office. Jones I,
supra note 9, at 593. These skills and resources are, in theory but not in practice, free to
the charging party. Id. a t n.62. In view of these factors, the decision to arbitrate or file a
charge requires the aggrieved party to balance the costs and benefits of both alternatives.
Even when the parties pursue NLRA remedies by invoking NLRB proceedings, the
Board may in certain cases defer action to arbitration. The Supreme Court has indicated
a clear preference for dispute resolution by arbitration rather than by the courts, at least
where the contract contains an arbitration provision. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
(the Steelworkers trilogy).
In NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), the Court upheld the Board in
interpreting a disputed, arbitrable contract and in determining that the employer had a
statutory obligation to furnish certain requested information. The result seems to be that
the Board may require disclosure of information where there is a statutory duty to disclose
and need not defer to arbitration even if the controversy over disclosure is expressly
arbitrable. Consequently, the NLRB has consistently refused to defer to arbitration in
LABOR
right-to-information cases subsequent to Acme Industrial. See THEDEVELOPING
LAW504 (C. Morris ed. 1971) and cases cited. However, the Board has chosen to defer to
arbitration refusal-to-disclose cases where (1) the contract contains express disclosure
provisions or expressly waives the right to such information, and (2) the dispute arguably
is covered by the grievance-arbitration provisions of the contract. See THEDEVELOPING
LAW86 (K. Hanslowe, L. Cohen, & E. Spelfogel eds. 1973 Supp.).
LABOR
13. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, [I9761 4 LAB.L. REP. (79 Lab. Cas.) 1 11,587,
at 21,555 (D. Kan. June 18, 1976).
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ing party, and the General Counsel.14 This section explores the
formal discovery methods currently available to these three parties in unfair labor practice proceedings and examines the limitations of each avenue.
I.

Discovery between bargaining parties

It is argued by some that all discovery devices authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available in NLRB adjudications. This argument is based on an interpretation of the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA which provide that any
unfair labor practice proceeding "shall, so far as practicable, be
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to
the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil
procedure for the district courts . . . ."I5 This argument has been
accepted by the Fifth Circuit19ut has been rejected by five others.17 There is no indication, however, that the Fifth Circuit's
acceptance of this argument has led to full discovery in practice
in that jurisdiction.
In actual practice the discovery devices available to the bargaining parties are extremely limited. Of the traditional means
of discovery authorized by the federal rules, only limited depositions are permitted under the current NLRB rules.18The Board's
deposition rule allows oral depositions upon proper written application, but only after the complaint is filed and before the case
14. Intervenors could also be included. See 29 C.F.R. 6 102.29 (1976).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). See 29 C.F.R. 6 102.39 (1976).
16. See NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273,276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
955 (1967); cf. McClain Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187, 189 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd
on other grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974) (argument accepted by district court in
Sixth Circuit).
17. See NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 694 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 77 (1976); D'Youville Manor, Lowell, Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir.
1975); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th
Cir. 1951); cf. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377, 377 n.2 (1951), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 196 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1952) (argument rejected by Board).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1976). The federal rules provide for discovery by depositions,
written interrogatories, and requests for admissions, physical and mental examinations,
production of documents and things, and entry upon land. FED.R. CIV. P. 26(a). NLRB
rules provide for three procedural devices that are tangentially related to discovery: (1)
prehearing conferences, 29 C.F.R. § 102.35(g) (1976); (2) subpoenas, 29 C.F.R. § 102.31
(1976); and (3) summary judgments, 29 C.F.R. 6 102.24 (1976). For a discussion and
CONcriticism of these rules, see 1 COMMENDATIONS AND REPORTSOF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
FERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES
558-60, 590-91, 640 (1971).
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is transfered from the administrative law judge to the Board." No
provision is made for other types of depositions that might be
beneficial to the resolution of labor disputes, e.g., depositions
upon written questions, depositions before the charge is filed or
complaint issued, or depositions subsequent to the Board's decision but prior to e n f ~ r c e m e n t . ~ ~
The literal language of the Board's rule does not expressly
preclude the use of depositions for discovery purposes, but the
Board and the courts have consistently ruled that use of depositions is limited to the securing of evidence for the adjudicatory
hearing. For example, in NLRB u. Interboro Contractors, I n ~ . , ~ l
the Second Circuit expressly rejected the notion that the NLRB's
deposition rule permitted depositions for discovery purposes. The
court upheld the Board's interpretation that the rule was intended only to preserve evidence when there was reason to believe
a witness would not be present at the hearing.
These limitations on discovery produce hardships on parties
properly seeking discovery and unjustifiable excuses for parties
avoiding discovery. Further, when a primary need for information
is central to the resolution of the parties' dispute, access or lack
of access to the information may be determinative of the whole
case or issue. To ameliorate this potential harshness, the Board
allows an unfair labor practice proceeding to force disclosure. An
unfair labor practice charge may be filed for the express purpose
of forcing a party engaged in collective bargaining to disclose
certain information in his possession. The charge generally is that
the refusal to disclose constitutes an unfair labor practice.
The NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer or a labor organization to refuse to bargain collect i ~ e l yThe
. ~ ~NLRB and the courts have long held that this duty
19. The application must set forth the reasons why the deposition should be taken,
the name and address of the witness, the subject matter of the expected testimony, the
time and place of the deposition, and the identity of the officer before whom the deposition
will be taken. The application must show good cause and must be addressed to the NLRB
regional director prior to the hearing or to the administrative law judge during or subsequent to the hearing. If ordered by the regional director or the administrative law judge,
the deposition may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths by law in
the United States, before certain American diplomatic personnel in foreign countries, or
before any person agreed upon by the parties. 29 C.F.R. 5 102.30 (1976).
20. Once a petition for enforcement or review is filed with the court of appeals, the
federal discovery rules may apply to the enforcement proceeding. See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
21. 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
22. 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1970):
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
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to bargain collectively includes a duty to supply the other party
with information that is necessary and relevant to proper bargaining, as well as with information needed for effective administration of an agreement already in force.23
The scope of a union's duty to disclose is still an unresolved
q~estion;~'
it is clear, however, that an employer has such a duty.
This duty is based on the belief that the information is necessary
for proper and intelligent performance of the union's duty of
effective representation of the employees." The union's right to
information may, however, be relinquished, either by "clear and
unmistakable" language in the agreement26or by subsequent
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provision of section 159(a) of this title.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-

...

(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is
the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section
159(a) of this title . . .
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment . . . .
23. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See generally THEDEVELOPING
LABOR
LAW309-22 (C. Morris ed.
1971);Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A
Study of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL
L. REV.
23 (1972); Di Fede, Employer Duty to Disclose Information in Collective Bargaining, 6
N.Y.L.F. 400 (1960); Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish InformationDuring the Contract
Term, 9 GA.L. REV.375 (1975); Gamey, Rehearing Discovery in NLRB Proceedings, 26
LAB.L.J. 710 (1975); Manoli & Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery Procedures, 18 AD. L. REV.9 (1966); Sherman, Employer's Obligation to Produce Data
for Collective Bargaining, 35 MINN.L. REV.24 (1950); Comment, Employers' Duty to
Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM.
L. REV.112 (1957); Note, A
Union's Right to Company Information for Use in Collective Bargaining-The Ninth
Circuit Approach, 4 RUT.-CAM.L.J. 362 (1973); Comment, Discovery Before the National
Labor Relations Board-An Unexpanded Concept, 12 S. TEX.L.J. 112 (1970).
24. Only passing discussion has been given to the union's duty to supply the employer
with information. See note 23 supra. NLRB member John H. Fanning has stated that he
knows of no union refusal-to-disclose cases. Fanning, supra note 23, at 381. See also Jones
II, supra note 10, a t 837 11-26. But see Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB.
L. REP. (1975-76 NLRB Dec.) 7 16,814 (May 28, 1976).
25. Whitin Mach. Works, 108N.L.R.B. 1537,1538,enforced per curium, 217 F.2d 593
(4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
26. See International News Sem. Div. of Hearst Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1070
(1955); California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436, 1439 (1952).

.
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union actions during the bargaining process.27Once the union has
made a good faith demand for relevant information that should
be disclosed, the employer must furnish it without undue delay."
Unwarranted piecemeal or dilatory disclosure constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith.29
Employers' contentions that the requested data is confidential or privileged have uniformly been rejected." In Aluminum
Ore Co.u. NLRB,31the Seventh Circuit stated:
[ w e do not believe that it was the intent of Congress in
[passing the NLRA] that, in the collective bargaining prescribed, the union, as representative of the employees, should be
deprived of the pertinent facts constituting the wage history of
its members. We can conceive of no justification for a claim that
such information is confidential. Rather it seems to go to the
very root of the facts upon which the merits were to be resolved.

For similar reasons, arguments that divulgence of information
would violate employees' rights of privacy have not been ac~epted.~~
NLRB cases involving charges that an employer is refusing
to bargain, or is bargaining in bad faith, by declining to disclose
generally fall into two categories: (1)cases involving wage data,33
i.e.,information concerning employees' incomes and fringe benefits and the method by which they are established, and (2) disputes concerning financial data,34i. e., data basically relating to
27. See Square D Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 1964).
28. E.g., NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260,264-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 834 (1963).
29. Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244, 1246-47 (1950).
30. See, e.g., Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 223 F.2d 58, 59 (1st Cir. 1955); NLRB
v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955).
31. 131 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942).
32. See, e.g., Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 575, 576 (2d Cir.
1956); Northwestern Photo Engraving Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 24, 48 (1962). But see NLRB v.
Winter Garden Citrus Prods. Coop., 260 F.2d 913, 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1958).
33. The wage data category includes lists of names and addresses of employees, lists
of wage rates, piecework rates, and hours worked, seniority lists, linked wage data, overtime data, incentive wage plan data, standards for computing merit pay increases, job
classifications and descriptions, retirement and pension plan data, welfare plan data,
profit sharing plan information, group insurance data, wage histories, lists of employment
dates, and time studies used to determine wage rates. See generally sources collected in
Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57
COLUM.
L. REV. 112, 112-14 (1957); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 880, 905-14 (1965 & Supp. 1976).
34. The financial data category includes, among other things, wage surveys, subcontracts data, information on orders, profit and loss statements, investment income data,
lists of executive salaries, net sales data, lists of customers and competitors, and company
books. See generally sources collected in Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic
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the economic and financial condition of the employer, such as
profits and production costs, especially when the employer makes
a claim of financial inability to meet a union request during bargaining.35The rules developed by the NLRB and the courts for
dealing with discovery of wage data differ from the rules evolved
for dealing with discovery of financial data.
In determining the kinds of wage data that must be disclosed, the NLRB and the courts initially required unions to
prove the relevance of the requested material? This requirement
was soon modified, however, when first the courts and then the
Board adopted a rule that requested information was presumptively relevant. In NLRB u. Yawman & Erbe Manufacturing
CO.,~'the Second Circuit, enforcing an NLRB order to disclose,
excused the union's failure to prove relevancy:
Since the employer has an affirmative statutory duty to
supply relevant wage data, his refusal to do so is not justified
by the Union's failure initially to show the relevance of the
requested information. The rule governing disclosure of data of
this kind is not unlike that prevailing in discovery procedures
under modern codes. There the information must be disclosed
unless it plainly appears i r r e l e ~ a n t . ~ ~

Then, in Whitin Machine Works,3vthe Board, without citing
Yawman & Erbe, adopted the presumptive relevance ruleU suggested by the Second Circuit. Simply stated, the rule is that the
Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM.
L. REV.112, 112-14 (1957); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d
880, 914-17 (1965 & Supp. 1976).
35. See Di Fede, supra note 23, at 402. The line between the two categories is an
elusive one. Some information disputes are hybrid in nature and do not fall clearly into
one category or the other. See Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for
Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM.
L. REV.112, 113 n.7 (1957). This analysis will proceed
as though the line were firmly drawn and the categories rigidly defined.
36. See Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 23, at 24; Di Fede, supra note 23, a t 403;
Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57
L. REV. 112, 117-18 (1957).
COLUM.
37. 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951), enforcing per curiam 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950).
38. Id. at 949.
39. 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
905 ( 1955).
40. The Board's adoption of the rule was clarified in two subsequent decisions in 1954.
In Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1635, 1639 (1954), enforced, 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955), the Board adopted the trial examiner's report, which had
relied on Yawman & Erbe in applying the presumptive relevance test. In Boston HeraldTraveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097, 2097-99 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955),
the Board unequivocally adopted the test, citing Whitin, Yawman & Erbe, and Item.
For a review of the development of the presumptive relevance rule, see Bartosic &
Hartley, supra note 23, at 24-29.
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union has a presumptive right to disclosure of certain in-unit
wage data4' during contract negotiation and administration. The
rationale for the rule was explained by Chairman Farmer in his
concurring opinion in Whitin:
[Tlhis broad rule is necessary to avoid the disruptive effect of
the endless bickering and jockeying which has theretofore been
characteristic of union demands and employer reaction to requests by unions for wage and related information. The unusually large number of cases coming before the Board involving
this issue demonstrates the disturbing effect upon collective
bargaining of the disagreements which arise as to whether particular wage information sought by the bargaining agent is sufficiently relevant to particular bargaining issues. I conceive the
proper rule to be that wage and related information pertaining
to the employees in the bargaining unit should, upon request,
be made available to the bargaining agent without regard to is
immediate relationship to the negotiation or administration of
the collective bargaining agreement.42

While the presumptive relevance rule has generally been
applied to the disclosure of in-unit wage data, it has not been
extended to out-of-unit wage data or financial data. In the landmark financial data case of NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing C O . , ~ ~
a union sought information concerning a company's financial
condition after the company asserted during contract negotiations that it was not financially able to meet a requested wage
increase. In affirming the NLRB's decision that refusal to supply
such information was an unfair labor practice, the Supreme
Court held that substantiation of the claimed inability to pay was
req~ired.'~
This substantiation doctrine has been widely applied
to cases involving requests for financial data whenever the employer has injected financial inability as a bargaining issue." Absent a claim by the employer of financial inability, however, it
41. This includes individual earnings, job rates and classifications, merit increases,
pension data, incentive earnings, piece rates, and the operation of the incentive system.
Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 23, at 28-29, and sources there collected.
42. 108 N.L.R.B. a t 1541 (concurring opinion).
43. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
44. See id. at 152-53.
45. See, e.g., Metlox Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 378 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1037 (1968); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 591, 592 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 852 (1966).
For a treatment of the question whether decisions since Truitt have confused the
substantiation doctrine and the presumptive relevance doctrine as they relate to the
requirement that all "necessary and relevant" information be disclosed, see Bartosic &
Hartley, supra note 23, a t 42-50.
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appears that the union would be required to show both the necessity and the relevancea of requested financial data.
2. Discovery and the NLRB

Different considerations come into play when the NLRB becomes involved in discovery procedures during a Board adjudication. Adjudications of unfair labor practice allegations are initiated by any individual or organization filing a charge with the
NLRB regional director." After the charge is investigated, the
regional director determines whether a complaint should be issued. The complaint, if issued, is prosecuted by the General
C o ~ n s e lThe
. ~ ~ General Counsel has little need to use formal discovery devices; usually, all of the information the General Counsel needs to prosecute the complaint is supplied by the charging
party or can be obtained by the regional director's investigation
of the charge.
The respondent or the charging party, however, may need
information possessed by the NLRB. For instance, the respondent or potential respondent frequently desires access to statements and records acquired by the regional director during investigation from interviews with persons knowledgeable with the
charges.4gAccess is sought for the avowed purpose of preparing
46. Necessity and relevance are not mutually exclusive requirements. "Once relevance is determined, an employer's refusal to honor a request is a per se violation of the
[NLRA]. Reasonable necessity for a union to have relevant data is apparent; necessity
is not a separate and unique guideline, but is directly related to the relevance of the
requested data." Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Div. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61,
69 (3d Cir. 1965).
47. NLRB unfair labor practice procedure is generally outlined in 29 C.F.R. $ 4 10102 (1976).
48. THEDEVELOPING
LABOR
LAW832-33 (C. Morris ed. 1971):
Under the Wagner Act, agents of the Board itself investigated charges,
issued complaints, and prosecuted the complaints. Hearings were conducted by
trial examiners, but their decisions were frequently reviewed by supervisors
prior to issuance and, a t the Board level, by a Review Section rather than by
attorneys reporting directly to Board members.
To satisfy widespread criticism of this sytem, the Taft-Hartley amendments . . . established an independent General Counsel with final authority
over investigation of charges, issuance of complaints, and prosecution of cases
before the Board. In addition, trial examiners were freed from supervisory influence over their decisions and were forbidden to consult with the Board about
exceptions to their rulings. The Review Section was abolished . . . .
(The title "trial examiner" was changed to "administrative law judge" in 1972. 37 Fed.
Reg. 16,787 (1972).) The General Counsel has delegated the investigative and complaintissuance functions to the NLRB regional directors.
49. The regional director utilizes members of the field staff to do the investigative
work but retains control over the investigation and may dispense with unnecessary por-
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defenses to the charges.50Access to these statements, however, is
permitted under NLRB rules only after the person making the
statement has testified a t the hearing. Even then, access is limited by requirements that only those portions of the statement
relevant to the subject matter of the testimony need be disclosed
and that the statement must be signed or otherwise approved by
the witnessa51As a result of these severe restrictions, access to
witness statements is almost nonexistent.
In addition to the limited discovery available under NLRB
rules, another possible method of obtaining information from the
Board or the General Counsel is by use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).52Since 1967, when the FOIA became effective, numerous attempts have been made to utilize its provisions
to secure witness statements and other information in the
NLRB's posses~ion.~~
The Supreme Court has noted, however,
that discovery for the benefit of private litigants is not one of the
express purposes of the FOIA,54and parties in Board proceedings
generally have been unsuccessful in invoking the FOIA as a discovery tool .55
tions. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1976). The investigation is acknowledged to be on behalf of the
General Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
50. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Supreme Court held that a
defendant in a federal criminal case is entitled, once a prosecution witness has testified,
to all prior statements by that witness touching the events and activities to which testimony was given. The basis of the decision was the notion that access to such statements
was necessary because of their impeachment value during cross-examination. In NLRB
v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403, 406-08 (2d Cir. 1958), the Second Circuit held
"Jencks-type" discovery to be required in NLRB proceedings. The Board thereafter
amended its rules in order to conform. See 29 C.F.R. Q 102.118 (1976); discussed in
Alleyne, The "Jencks Rule" in NLRB Proceedings, 9 B.C. INDUS.& COM.L. REV. 891
(1968); cf. Ra-Rich Mfg. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 701-02 (1958) (NLRB acquiescence to
Jencks rule).
51. 29 C.F.R. 8 102.118 (1976). If the General Counsel elects not to comply with an
administrative law judge's order to disclose, the only apparent sanction is striking the
witness' testimony.
The Board's rules generally prohibit any NLRB employee from producing information
in the Board's possession, whether in response to a subpoena or otherwise, without the
written consent of the NLRB. Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a treatment of the federal FOIA as a
discovery device in judicial proceedings, see Adams, The Freedom of Information Act and
Pretrial Discovery, 43 MIL. L. REV.1 (1969); Note, The Federal Freedom of Information
Act as a n Aid to Discovery, 54 IOWAL. REV. 141 (1968).
53. Garvey, supra note 23, a t 710.
54. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975); Renegotiation Bd.
v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974).
55. See Roger J . Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.8d 80, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1976); Title
Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 98 (1976);
Marathon LeTourneau Co., Marine Div. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (S.D. Miss.
1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Capital Cities
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Another avenue of discovery is sometimes available whenever the Board is a party in a federal court action. When this is
the case, the other parties may obtain information from the
Board or the General Counsel by direct application of the federal
discovery rules.56For example, these provisions may be utilized
when (1)an FOIA action is brought against the Board in district
court, (2) the Board seeks a district court injunction under the
NLRA,57(3) the Board seeks to enforce its order by petition to a
court of appeals pursuant to the NLRA,58or (4) the Board seeks
Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971,976-77 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Local 30, AFLCIO v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976); NLRB v. Biophysics Syss., Inc., 78
Lab. Cas. 20,781 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1976); Fuselier & Moeller, NLRB Investigatory Records: Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 10 U. RICH.L. REV.541 (1976).
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 404 (1960) (discovery by
Board allowed in contempt proceedings); NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 408 F.2d 803
(5th Cir. 1969) (discovery permitted before master to hear contempt proceedings); Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381,384 (10th Cir. 1964) (subpoena duces tecum
allowed against regional director in injunction action); Madden v. Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753, 229 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (limited discovery permitted in injunction
proceeding); Fusco v. Richard W. Kasse Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962)
(limited discovery permitted in injunction proceeding); Note, Labor Law-Discovery ProL. REV.286 (1958); cf.
cedure Prior to Institution of Contempt Proceedings, 27 FORDHAM
Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960)
(direct district court action seeking declaratory judgment of employer's right to inspect
affidavits in Board's possession dismissed for want of jurisdiction).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970):
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition
any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor
practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides
or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon
the filing of any such petition the court . . . shall have jurisdiction to grant to
the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
The NLRA provides, in cases involving certain union unfair labor practices, that if
there is reasonable cause to believe the unfair labor practices charges to be true, the
investigating officer
shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within
any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged
to have occurred, or wherein such person [charged] resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the
Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the
district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be
issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable
injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining
order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the
expiration of such period. . . .
29 U.S.C. 4 160(1) (1970).
58. 29 U.S.C. 5 160(e) (1970):
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
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a civil contempt decree in a court of appeals after the Board's
order has been enforced but not obeyed. This discovery avenue,
however, is at best quite limited because of the extraordinary and
restricted nature of federal judicial intervention in labor relations.
A final discovery alternative is that of compelling discovery
by a bill of particular^.^^ Such a bill is possible under the Board's
. ~ NLRB has been reluctant to
unlimited motion p r a c t i ~ e The
furnish bills of particulars for the same reasons it has opposed
discovery generally." Judge Learned Hand has characterized
these bills as being "of slight value in a trial by hearings at interval~,"'~
such as NLRB adjudication^.^ Bills of particulars are of
limited utility since their purpose is to increase the specificity of
the charges." Consequently, employers and unions have made
little use of them?

11. THENEEDFOR CHANGE
IN NLRB DISCOVERY
As discussed above, discovery is severely restricted in NLRB
States . . . for the enforcement of [the Board's] order and for appropriate
temporary relief or restraining order . . . . Upon the filing such petition, the
court . . . shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question
determined therein . . . .
The NLRA also permits any person aggrieved by a Board order to petition a court of
appeals for review of the order. The court of appeals proceeds on such review petitions as
it does enforcement petitions under § 160(e). 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
59. In common law practice, a bill of particulars is "[a] written statement or specification of the particulars of the demand for which an action a t law is brought . . . furnished by one of the parties to the other, either voluntarily or in compliance with a judge's
h w DICTIONARY
212 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
order for that purpose." BLACK'S
The corresponding equitable bill of discovery seems never to have been applied to
labor relations. This may be because the merger of law and equity has removed the fine
distinction between the two bills. For cases in the nature of a bill of discovery, see McClain
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974) and Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden,
280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960). See generally B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTEUTIVE
LAW § 98 (1976); Deuelopments-Discovery, supra note 3, a t 946-51.
60. See 29 C.F.R. 6 9 102.24-28 (1976).
61. See Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 295 (1960), enforced
per curium, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961); Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local 100, 128
N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960), enforced per curium, 291 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1961).
62. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862,873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U S .
576 (1938).
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.43 (1976).
64. In this sense they are analogous to motions for more definite statements in civil
practice. See FED.R. CIV. P. 12(e).
65. But see NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 591
(5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Automotive Textile Prods. Co., 422 F.2d 1255, 1256 (6th Cir.
1970), enforcing per curiam 171 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1968); North American Rockwell Corp. v.
NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Associated Naval Architects, Inc.,
355 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1966).
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adjudications. Except for the burdensome and slow process of
filing an unfair labor practice charge, parties attempting to satisfy their primary needs for wage or financial data during collective bargaining and contract administration find little discovery
to be available. This limited discovery is especially evident when
subsidiary needs for information are involved. Similarly, in practice there is almost no discovery available against the NLRB
under federal statutes or federal or Board rules.
Despite these restrictions on NLRB discovery, it has been
argued that adequate discovery already exists in NLRB adjudications. This argument is usually propounded in one of four forms:
(1)the NLRA makes at least part of the federal discovery rules
applicable to NLRB adjudications;" (2) bills of particulars are an
effective discovery alternative in Board proceedings;"(3) trial-byinterval, which is possible under the Board's rules," allows respondents to adequately prepare their defenses during continuances, alleviating the need for prehearing discovery; or (4) the
provisions made in the present Board rules for deposition^^^ and
production of witness statementsT0are sufficient. As has been
noted above, however, the severe limitations on these discovery
alternatives allow no "real opportunities for dis~overy."~~
The
need for discovery in NLRB adjudications is illustrated by the
following fact situations.
Fact Situation # I . Employee A has filed a charge and the
NLRB regional director has issued a complaint alleging that employer X has engaged in unfair labor practices in discharging A.
B, A's former supervisor, reports to X's management that A was
fired because he was strongly implicated in thefts of X's property.
A asserts that he was discharged solely because of his union activities. X has reason to believe that A and other employees have
given statements to Board investigators, but all current employees deny this and refuse to discuss the incident. In order to prepare a defense, X would like to verify the existence and examine
66. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
68. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.43 (1976) (granting discretion to administrative law judge to
continue the hearing from day to day); cf., NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862,
873 (2d Cir. 1938) (bill of particulars of slight value in trials-by-interval).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1976).
70. 29 C.F.R. 4 102.118 (1976) (NLRB Jencks rule); see notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
71. Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN.L. REV.1035, 1056
(1964).
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the contents of any such statements that the NLRB might possess.72
Fact Situation #2. Employer A and union B are engaged in
negotiations toward a new collective bargaining agreement. B has
demanded a flat 12 percent increase in the hourly rates of the
machinists B represents. A contends that it is unable to meet
such a demand because of recent financial setbacks. A also asserts that the results of an industry-wide wage survey indicate
that A's employees are already the best paid in the business. In
order to represent its constituent employees effectively, B would
like to have access to A's books and wage survey in order to verify
A's claims.73
Recognition that these and other fact situations demonstrate
that valid discovery needs exist has inspired numerous calls for
NLRB adjudicatory discovery.74In one oft-quoted passage, the
Fourth Circuit observed that "the Board, acting in a quasijudicial
capacity as it does, should freely permit discovery procedure in
order that the rights of all parties may be properly prote~ted."'~
The failure of the Board to permit discovery, it is said,
"complicates litigation and discourages ~ettlements."~'Vi
"thorough review" of the Board's present position has been
Administrative procedure study groups have consistently
.~~
the permanent
advocated administrative d i s c ~ v e r yIndeed,
72. In current NLRB practice, access to these statements is possible only through the
inadequate NLRB Jencks rule. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
73. Under current Board law and doctrine, access might be obtained only through the
mechanism of filing an unfair labor practice charge and prosecuting a complaint unless
A agrees to permit access. See notes 22-46 and accompanying text supra. Obviously, this
is an ineffective discovery alternative.
74. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 119761 4 LAB.L. REP. (79 Lab. Cas.)
111,587 (D. Kan. June 18, 1976) (court in FOIA action "shocked" by stringent limits on
NLRB discovery); Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB. L. REP. (1975-76
NLRB Dec.) 7 16,814 (May 28, 1976) (Murphy, Chmn., dissenting); Jenkins, supra note
3, a t 101. It is interesting to note that member Jenkins did not join in Chairman Murphy's
dissent in Tool & Die Makers'.
75. NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965).
76. Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law-A Preliminary Paper, 35 J . AIR L. &
COM.537, 559 (1969).
77. 36 Mo. L. REV.537, 544 (1971); see Garvey, supra note 23, a t 723.
78. In 1941 the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure recognized that the purposes served by discovery were also applicable to formal administrative
proceedings and recommended certain prehearing procedures. COMM.ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
APPOINTED
BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,
S. DOC.NO. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1941). In 1953 a subcommittee of
the Presidential administrative procedure conference was "fragmented" over discovery
and failed to agree on a report. Discovery in Administrative Proceedings, 14 FED.COM.

8451

NLRB DISCOVERY PRACTICE

861

Administrative Conference of the United States has formally recommended that private parties to adjudicatory proceedings
"have equal access to all relevant, unprivileged information at
some point prior to the hearing," and has proposed certain minimum standards to guide administrative agencies in adopting discovery rules." Congressional groups have also favored administrative discovery.80 In fact, discovery-type rules have been
adopted by several other administrative agencies.81The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), in 1961, was the first major agency to
adopt some sort of d i s ~ o v e r yIn
. ~1968,
~
both the Federal Maritime
B.J. 99, 100 (1955) (Committee on Pleadings, Chairman Rupert's report). The conference
ON ADdid, however, propose an illustrative rule for prehearing conferences. CONFERENCE
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
FIRSTREPORT10-11, 24-28 (1953). In 1955 the second Hoover
commission recommended that agencies conform with certain federal discovery rules.
AND PROCEDURE,
COMM'N
ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE EXECUTASKFORCEON LEGALSERVICES
TIVE BRANCH
OF THE GOVERNMENT,
REPORTON LEGALSERVICES
AND PROCEDURE
197 (1955).
In 1962 the interim Administrative Conference of the United States formally approved the principle of administrative adjudicatory discovery and recommended that
"each agency adopt rules providing for discovery to the extent and in the manner appropriate to its proceedings." Recommendation No. 30, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
37 (1963). The report of the Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings of
the Conference discussed the advantages attendant to broader administrative discovery
and concluded that the adoption of discovery would promote fairness and reduce delays.
Id. a t 115.
79. 1 C.F.R. § 305.70-4 (1976).
80. S. 1663, introduced by Senators Dirksen and Long in 1963 to amend the Administrative Procedure Act, provided in part: "Depositions and discovery shall be available to
the same extent and in the same manner as in a civil proceeding in the district courts of
the United States except to the extent an agency shall find such conformity is impracticable and shall otherwise provide by published rule." Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1964). The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure revised this section to read: "To the extent an agency shall find
it practicable, depositions and discovery shall be available to the same extent and in the
same manner as in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. a t 7. The full committee,
however, failed to report out the bill, no doubt due to the more controversial nature of
the bill's other provisions.
Senators Dirksen and Long introduced a nearly identical bill in the next Congress.
S. 1336,89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG.Rm. 4090 (1965). This bill retained the substance
of the original discovery provision of S. 1663. S. 1336 passed the Senate, 112 CONG.REC.
13,739 (1966), but died in committee in the House. S. 1336 was reintroduced as S. 518,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG.REC.946, 951 (1967), but, like its predecessor, S. 1663, it
failed to clear the Senate Judiciary Committee.
81. For a general discussion of administrative discovery, see Berger, Discovery in
Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up With the Courts, 46
A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKEL.J. 89;
Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN.L. REV. 1035 (1964).
82. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE
UNITED
STATES
578 (1971); see 16 C.F.R. ee3.31-.39 (1976). The FTC rules were broadened
in 1967. For a discussion of the FTC rules, both before and after the 1967 changes, see
Kintner, Discovery in Administrative Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 AD.L. REV.233 (1964);
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Commission (FMC)83and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)84responded to the Administrative Conference's recommendation and adopted new discovery rules. Since then, the
recommendation has been implemented in whole or in part by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),85the now-defunct Atomic Energy C o m r n i s s i ~ nthe
, ~ ~Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, and the Postal Rate C o m m i ~ s i o nLimited
.~~
discovery is available by rules of the Federal Power C o r n m i s s i ~ n , ~ ~
the Civil Aeronautics Board,89the Securities and Exchange Cornmission,90the Federal Reserve System,g1the Foreign Claims Setthe Federal Energy Admini~tration,'~
and
tlement Cornmis~ion,~~
the Federal Aviation Administrati~n?~
In addition to the facts that NLRB discovery has been widely
advocated and that discovery rules have been adopted by many
other administrative agencies, one potent argument in favor of
adoption of NLRB discovery is that discovery would eliminate
surprise in the adjudicatory process.g5The Supreme Court has
Mezines & Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. REV. 55
(1966); Rowe, Nicholson, & Lewis, Discovery Symposium-The Role of Discovery in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, 21 AD. L. REV.439 (1969); Kintner, Recent Changes
in Federal Trade Commission Discovery Practice, 37 ANTITRUST
L.J. 238 (1968); Stewart
& Ward, FTC Discovery: Depositions, the Freedom of Information Act and Confidential
L. J. 248 (1968).
Informants, 37 ANTITRUST
83. 46 C.F.R. § § 502.201-.211 (1976). See 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1970), which was enacted
to overrule FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964), criticized
in Galland, A Note on Maritime Discovery, 19 AD. L. REV.119 (1966).
84. 11 F.C.C.2d 185 (1968), 47 C.F.R. $4 1.311-.325 (1976). The pre-1968 FCC rules
are discussed in Note, The Lack of Discovery in Federal Communications Commission
Proceedings-An Exercise in the Denial of Basic Fairness, 32 GEO.WASH.L. REV. 328
(1963). The 1968 rules are treated in Symposium-The FCC's New Discovery Procedures,
22 FED.COM.B.J. 3 (1968).
85. 49 C.F.R. §$ 1100.56-.68 (1976).
86. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.740-.744, 3.206-.207 (1974).
87. ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
STATES,
1971-72 REPORT
33 (1972).
88. 18 C.F.R. $0 1.23-.24 (1976). But see Ross, Discovery and the Federal Power
Commission, 18AD. L. REV.177 (1966) (FPC rules said to approach federal discovery rules
in scope).
89. See 14 C.F.R. $8 302.19-.20, .23 (1976); cf. Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures
Before the C.A.B., 18 AD. L. REV. 157 (1966) (discussing CAB discovery rules prior to
implementation of the Administrative Conference's recommendation).
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.15 (1976); cf. Frankhauser & Belman, The Right to Information in the Administrative Process: A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
18 AD. L. REV.101 (1966) (discussing SEC discovery practice as of 1966).
91. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 263.7-3 (1976).
92. See 45 C.F.R. $9 501.2, .5-.6 (1976).
93. See 10 C.F.R. $0 205.8, 303.8 (1976).
94. See 14 C.F.R. $0 13.53, .57 (1976).
95. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, [I9761 4 LAB. L. REP. (79 Lab. C a d
fi 11,587 (D. Kan. June 18, 1976); Marathon LeTourneau Co., Marine Div. v. NLRB, 414
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stated that discovery and other pretrial procedures "make a trial
less a game of blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."" The purpose of eliminating surprise would be served by
the adoption of liberal discovery rules by the NLRB. As the first
fact situation above illustrates, the present lack of discovery in
NLRB adjudications can lead to circumstances where the respondent to an unfair labor practice complaint may be seriously disadvantaged in his preparation for adjudication and consequently
may be confronted at the hearing with new factual and legal
issues for which he is inadequately prepared. Notions of basic
fairnessg7would indicate that the respondent and the General
Counsel should have equal opportunities to prepare their cases.
With the decline of the "sporting theory of justice,"g8 parties in
civil actions have found discovery tools to be useful in trial preparation; similarly, adoption of discovery rules by the NLRB would
help equalize the ability of parties to Board proceedings to prepare their cases.
Because of the inadequacy of present NLRB discovery and
the need for discovery in Board adjudications, there is a distinct
need for the Board to adopt discovery rules. The major consideration here is what form those rules should take. While original
rules could be drafted for Board discovery,0% has been suggested
that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

-

-

F. Supp. 1074,1084 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409
F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
96. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
97. Elements of procedural due process are closely allied with notions of fairness.
Thus, i t may be argued that the Board's failure to allow formal discovery in unfair labor
practice proceedings is a denial of due process. This argument has generally been rejected,
however. See NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 77 (1976); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 823 (1961) (Board regulations on their face not violative of due process); NLRB
v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951) (denial of deposition subpoena
not violative of due process); Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294,
296 (1960), enforced per curium, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961) (lack of Board rule for production of documents not a denial of due process); Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local
100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960), enforced per curiam, 291 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1961)
(denial of bill of particulars not a denial of due process). But see McClain Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 381 I?. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd on other grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir.
1974). An in-depth procedural due process analysis, however, is wanting in all these
decisions.
98. One of the underlying purposes of the federal discovery rules is to escape from
this sporting theory. Developments-Discovery, supra note 3, a t 1028.
99. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 23.
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dure be adopted.loOThis comment is limited to discussion of the
applicability of the federal rules. lo'

111. THEAPPLICABILITY
OF THE FEDERAL
DISCOVERY
RULESTO
NLRB PROCEEDINGS
A.

General Objections

Several arguments have been raised against adoption of discovery rules by the NLRB. A general discussion of five of these
arguments-intrusion, expense, formalization, abuse, and unique
circumstances-is included a t this point as a necessary preface to
an analysis of the federal rules' specific applicability to Board
proceedings.
Some fear that expanded discovery will be overly intrusive
into the affairs of labor and management. This apprehension is
evidenced by decisions that limit the union's right to information
concerning the employer's financial condition. In fact, elements
of this misgiving may be found in almost every refusal-to-disclose
case. Management may have justifiable concerns, for in many
instances unions have attempted to secure, and occasionally have
succeeded in securing, such data as executive salary lists, customer lists, company books, profitfloss statements, and other information usually considered to be within the "management prerogative."lo2The existence of the "internal affairs" doctrine embodied in the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization,"lo3illustrates that union
leadership may also validly fear intrusion.
It is doubtful, however, that this fear justifies a refusal to
adopt discovery rules. Mere cries of potential intrusion carry little
weight. The federal discovery rules implicitly recognize the prob100. Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB.L. REP. (1975-76 NLRB Dec.)

fi 16,814, at 27,771 n.7 (May 28, 1976) (dissenting opinion).
101. Other sets of rules have been suggested for NLRB adoption. See 1 C.F.R. O
305.70-4 (1976) (Recommendation 70-4 of the Administrative Conference of the United
States); Gamey, supra note 23, a t 720-23. As a whole, the federal rules seem preferable to
these other sets. Practitioners are familiar with the use of the federal rules, and extensive
case law and commentary discussing and interpreting the rules exists. (Perhaps it is for
these reasons that the Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation is similar
in form to the federal rules.) Gamey's proposed rules may be criticized for their imbalance
toward discovery by respondents and from the Board.
102. See generally sources collected in Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM.
L. REV.112, 112-14 (1957); Annot., 2
A.L.R.3d 880, 905-23 (1965 & Supp. 1976).
103. 29 U.S.C. # 158(a)(2) (1970).
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lem of intrusion by providing exceptions for "privileged" matterslo4and by allowing discovery to be terminated upon a showing
of annoyance, embarassment, or oppression.lo5If the federal rules
were adopted without major change, protective orders would be
available upon a proper showing of good cause;lo6the Board and
the courts would likely not be hesitant in granting such orders.
A second fear is that discovery might require a party to make
unreasonable expenditures. Although any use of discovery devices entails expense, the issue is whether the rule adopted would
provide adequate protection against discovery imposing unreasonable expense. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
recognizing a policy designed to minimize litigation expense,lo7
permits protective orders on a showing of "undue burden or expense."lo8 Other rules provide for the shifting of expenses when
that not only
one party is dilatory or u n c o ~ p e r a t i v ea, ~solution
~~
encourages disclosure, but also provides some relief for the party
who is forced to go to great expense to produce evidence that is
readily available to his opponent. Thus, it generally appears that
the federal rules satisfactorily answer the threat of unreasonable
expense in NLRB adjudications, absent a showing that the peculiar circumstances of NLRB proceedings require more stringent
protection of the parties than the federal rules provide.
Another frequently mentioned concern is that adoption of
formal rules would inject an undesirable amount of legal formality into what is otherwise a relatively informalllo procedure. Unlike the specters of intrusion and expense, the threat of formalization has no direct analog in civil actions; even summary dispositions of civil actions, through devices such as summary judgment,
are formal in nature. The question, then, is whether adoption of
discovery rules would formalize and complicate the NLRB adjud i c a t o r ~process, and whether this formalization and complication would be undesirable.
The adoption of discovery rules actually may simplify, not
complicate, the process. Such rules, it has been suggested, put
104. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(b)(l).
105. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(c), 30(d).
106. See FED.R. CIV.P. 26(c).
107. Jones 11, supra note 10, at 843.
108. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(c).
109. See FED.R. CIV.P. 30(g), 37(a)(4), 37(b)(2), 37(c), 37(d). But see FED.R. CN.
P. 37(f). See generally FED.R. CIV.P. 1 (rules to be "construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action").
110. For a brief discussion of informal discovery in the collective bargaining process,
see notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
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the parties "in a frame of mind to settle."lll Early settlement of
disputes would tend to expedite the process. Indeed, Justice
Brennan has observed that perhaps discovery procedures are
most needed in the small case where the detriment of formalization would presumably be felt the strongest.l12
But assuming arguendo that some formalization would result
if the federal discovery rules were adopted, there remains for
discussion the question whether such formalization is indeed
undesirable and unwarranted. The major concern voiced is that
formalization might lead to delay in the adjudicatory proceeding.l13Delay is of particular concern in labor-management controversies, where it has been said that "[tlime is of the e~sence.""~
Because of the susceptibility of NLRB proceedings to delay, it has
been suggested that NLRB discovery should be more restricted
than other administrative discovery.l15 On the other hand, prehearing discovery has been urged on administrative agencies as
a device to shorten normal time spans in adjudication.l16Thus,
it is uncertain whether adoption of NLRB discovery rules would
actually result in unwarranted delays in adjudications.
111. Brennan, Introduction to the Problem of the Protracted Case, 23 F.R.D. 376,379
(1958).
112. Id.; Jones 11, supra note 10, a t 842.
113. Delay has been termed the "nemesis" of discovery. Jones I, supra note 9, a t 572.
Protracted delays are a "serious and notorious shortcoming in administrative procedure."
Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN.L. REV. 1035,1061-66 (1964);
see, e.g., Fascell, Complexities and Delays in Administrative Procedures Must Be
Eliminated, 46 A.B.A.J. 49 (1960); Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and
Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49 A.B.A.J. 833 (1963); Prettyman, Reducing the Delay in Administrative Hearings: Suggestions for Oficers and Counsel, 39 A.B.A.J. 966 (1953). See also
SUBCOMM.
ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE,
SENATE
COMM.ON THE JUDICIARY,
CHARTSON DELAYIN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
8 9 CONG.,
~ ~ 2~ SESS., EVALUATION
(Comm. Print 1966).
114. Hearings on S. 518 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1967) (testimony
of NLRB Chairman McCulloch).
115. See Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN.L. REV. 1035,
1064 (1964).
116. Gallagher, Use of Pre-trial as a Means of Overcoming Undue and Unnecessary
Delay in Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL.44 (1959). Pretrial discovery in
NLRB proceedings has likewise been advocated:
Another factor which contributes to delay is the absence of pretrial discovery. Its availability would shorten the time required for hearings and probably
lead to fairer trials and settlements. This has been the experience under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is nothing peculiar to the law under
the National Labor Relations Act which would suggest a contrary result.
Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal h b o r Law-Concerning a Specialized Article 111 Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 482
(1972) (footnote omitted).
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Another concern is the potential for abuse. Discovery might
be misused to force injudicious settlements, to embarrass the
adverse party, to delay the proceeding, to burden the parties with
costs and inconveniences disproportionate to their interest in resolving the dispute, to invade privileges, or to intrude into management prerogatives and union internal affairsY7 While all of
these potential abuses are present in some form in proceedings to
which the federal discovery rules now apply, the fact is that abuse
of these rules has been minimal. Safeguards have been built into
the rules and counsel have exercised restraint in their use. Similar
safeguards could be incorporated into any NLRB discovery rules,
and no reason appears why counsel would not exercise similar
restraint.
Additional arguments have been raised that the unique circumstances of labor relations and Board proceedings make discovery rules impracticable. One area of potential discovery abuse
unique to the labor context is the intimidation of employees by
employers. The misgiving here is that employers would identify
by discovery and harass employees who gave evidence against
their employers' practices to Board investigators or a t hearings.
Also, there is fear that the Board's investigative function might
be impaired, since employees, knowing that their statements
were freely discoverable, might be less candid in their disclosures.l18 Of course, prehearing statements of employees who actually testify are available to employers for cross-examination
The threat of intimidation of these witnesses would
apparently be the same regardless of whether or not discovery was
employed.120
The rules could be drafted to include safeguards against potential reprisals. One suggested alternative is to incorporate into
the proposed rules a rebuttable presumption that any subsequent
detrimental change in the employment of a laborer who gave the
Board information is retaliatory and itself an unfair labor practice.121With such a procedural safeguard, witness lists and statements could be made discoverable without impairing Board investigations or subjecting employees to too great a risk of intimidation and harassment.
A second area unique to NLRB proceedings is discovery in
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Jones 11, supra note 10, at 847.
Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 1964).
See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
See NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 408 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Garvey, supra note 23, at 718-23.
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the primary need situation. Although both primary and subsidiary needs for information exist, it should be recognized that the
federal discovery rules are mainly designed to fulfill only subsidiary needs. Only rarely will a civil action be brought when the only
remedy sought is disclosure of information by the other party.12*
Primary needs are met either through nonjudicial means, or not
at all. In labor law, however, primary needs have arisen sufficiently often to produce a large body of "NLRB common law" on
the subject.
The concern here is whether a body of rules developed to
meet subsidiary needs for information between adverse parties
may be transplanted into a field where primary needs arise more
frequently. Arguably, the federal discovery rules would meet primary needs too well, giving the charging party in a refusal-todisclose case too much leverage in the bargaining process. Reason
and experience suggest, however, that the Board and the courts
would develop rules and doctrines that would insure continued
balance in the negotiating process.123

B. Analysis of Specific Discovery Provisions
The federal discovery rules authorize depositions, interrogatories, requests for admissions, physical and mental
examinations, and requests for production of documents and
things and entry upon land. The applicability to NLRB proceedings of these discovery devices as permitted by the federal rules,
together with the possible sanctions for failure to make discovery,
is discussed below.
122. Obviously, FOIA actions are exceptions to the general rule.
123. There are no obvious conflicts between the somewhat amorphous relevancy restriction of the federal discovery rules and the relevancy doctrine that can be distilled from
labor case law in refusal-to-disclose cases. Compare FED.R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) and 8 C.
WRIGHT
& A. MILLER,
FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
§§ 2008-09 (1970) with notes 3642 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, the primary need cases rejecting claims of
privilege are not in conflict with corresponding civil cases.
Arguably, some primary need cases would be decided differently if the federal rules
applied. For example, in Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB.L. REP.(197576 NLRB Dec.) f 16,814 (May 28, 1976), the Board refused an employer's request to order
production of documents in the union's possession that the union claimed were dispositive
of a grievable and arbitrable dispute. The Board distinguished other refusal-to-disclose
cases by stating that they involved information which had been specifically identified,
enabling the Board to make an initial determination of relevancy. Under the federal rules,
the documents most likely would have been ordered disclosed because they were obviously
germane to the subject matter of the unfair labor practice proceeding. Curiously, the
Board's majority opinion failed to discuss the appropriateness of an in camera inspection
of the documents, and the dissenters were unclear whether they favored such an inspection.
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1. Depositions

Probably the most widely utilized discovery device is the
deposition. Even among administrative agencies with limited discovery rules its use is common.lz4In fact, all seven major federal
agencies permit the taking of evidence by some form of deposition
procedure. 125
The need for discovery depositions in NLRB adjudications is
acute.lZ6Although evidentiary depositions are presently allowed
under NLRB practice,12' the Board has steadily refused to grant
discovery depositions because of fears of harassment and intimidation of employees. Nevertheless, the availability and use of
discovery depositions may actually protect employees from such
risks if testifying at a deposition is considered to be giving NLRAprotected testimony.128With the addition of a presumption of
retaliation if there are subsequent detrimental changes in a
worker's employment, the federal rule for depositions upon oral
examination, Rule 30, should effectively meet the need for NLRB
discovery depositions.
Rule 30 authorizes oral depositions, for discovery purposes.
Leave of court is generally not a requirement for the taking of a
deposition. The rule also provides for means of preserving objections to the proceedings and terminating or limiting examinations
"conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party."12' This procedural safeguard, exercised upon motions to terminate or limit
examination, should prove to be particularly useful in NLRB
adjudications.
However, two other federal rules relating to depositions need
124. For example, depositions are authorized by the Federal Aviation Administration, 14 C.F.R. Ej 13.53 (1976); the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. 9 263.8 (1976); the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 45 C.F.R. 0 501.5 (1976); and the Postal Rate
Commission, 39 C.F.R. 0 3001.33 (1976).
125. CAB: 14 C.F.R. § 302.20 (1976); FCC: 47 C.F.R. $0 1.315-.321 (1976); FPC; 18
C.F.R. 0 1.24 (1976); FTC: 16 C.F.R. 0 3.33 (1976); ICC: 49 C.F.R. $ § 1100.58-.61 (1976);
NLRB: 29 C.F.R. 0 102.30 (1976); SEC: 17 C.F.R. 8 201.15 (1976); see 46 C.F.R. 06
502.202- .2O5 (1976) (FMC rules).
AND REPORTS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE
126. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS
UNITEDSTATES603 (1971).
127. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
128. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE
UNITEDSTATES604 (1971); see NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972). The NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)
(1970).
129. FED. R. CIV.P. 30(d).
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not be adopted by the Board. Rule 31, authorizing depositions
upon written questions, and Rule 27, permitting precomplaint
and postdecision depositions, are both rarely used in civil practice. Unless future experience by the NLRB showed otherwise,
similar disuse could be expected of analogous NLRB rules.
Rule 32, specifying the uses of depositions in court proceedings, should be adopted with appropriate modifications. Such a
rule is necessary in a working discovery scheme in order to insure
that both the evidentiary and discovery natures of depositions are
preserved.
2.

Written interrogatories

Perhaps the second most commonly used discovery tool in
judicial proceedings is the written interrogatory. Rule 33 makes
available the use of interrogatories by any party against any other
party without leave of court. In civil practice, these interrogatories have proven useful, popular, and versatile.lsOUnlike the deposition, however, the interrogatory has had limited usage in administrative proceedings; of the major agencies, only the three
with broad discovery rules patterned on the federal rules, the
FCC, FMC, and ICC, permit written interrogatory practice.lsl No
such provision is made in the NLRB rules.
The adoption of an NLRB interrogatory rule raises two concerns. First, the use of interrogatories might cause significant
delay in the adjudicatory process. Some delay would be inevitable, for it has been observed that a large organization may be
unable to answer even a simple interrogatory in fifteen days,ls2
but most delays could be avoided by clearly defining in the rules
the time period during which interrogatories might be propounded and perhaps by limiting the number of interrogatories
that might be used.133Second, interrogatories, while relatively
inexpensive to draft, may impose considerable burdens on the
130. 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER,
supra note 123, a t 5 2163; Developments-Discovery,
supra note 3, at 959.
131. FCC: 47 C.F.R. § 1.323 (1976); FMC: 46 C.F.R. 4 502.206 (1976); ICC: 49 C.F.R.
5 1100.62 (1976).
132. Speck, supra note 3, at 1144.
133. Such numerical limits could be set by the rules or be determined a t a prehearing
conference. Such a conference for the express purpose of considering the proper use and
timing of discovery is authorized by the FCC rules. 47 C.F.R. 5 1.311(c)(l) (1976). However, this purpose is apparently not served by prehearing conferences in current NLRB
practice. See 32 Fed. Reg. 13,348 (1967) (NLRB prehearing conferences to immediately
precede hearings).
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answering party;ls4thus, the temptation for their misuse is great.
Misuse could be discouraged, however, if the Board and the
courts were liberal in limiting discovery upon a proper showing
of undue burden or expense, as the federal rules allow.
These two concerns are outweighed by the utility of interrogatories in aiding parties to prepare their cases. Administrative
law practitioners have generally favored their availability because they are easy to use.135Written interrogatories are essential
in an effective discovery scheme since they "provide a much
needed vehicle for inquiring of another party about the existence
and location of documents and other relevant evidence."136Rule
33 should be adopted by the Board because of its conciseness and
proven workability. The adopted rule should allow interrogatories
to be served on any party to the proceeding, including the General
Counsel.ls7
3. Other discovery devices

Requests for admissions are permitted by the FCC,138the
FMC,lsVthe FTC,140and the ICC.141 The FTC experience has
shown that a modest role is played by this device in administrative adjudications. Admittedly, requests for admissions are somewhat cumbersome. Nevertheless, a rule on requests for admissions should prove useful in many cases where a prehearing conference is not necessary or would be wasteful in securing stipulations concerning facts, law, or the admissibility of evidence.142
The federal rule on requests for admissions, Rule 36, should be
134. Developments-Discovery, supra note 3, at 960.
135. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE
UNITEDSTATES
627 (1971).
136. Id.
137. The Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation suggested that interrogatories directed to the agency be permitted. 1 C.F.R. @ 305.70-4(4)(b)(1976).The
interrogatory provision of the Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation is
substantially similar to the federal interrogatory rule. Compare 1 C.F.R. 8 305.70-4(4)
(1976)with FED.R. CIV.P. 33.Rule 33 also affords the option to produce business records
whenever the answer to an interrogatory requires an examination or audit of such records
and the burden of deriving the answer is substantially the same for either party. This
provision should also be adopted by the Board, since, for example, a union's request for
relevant information in an employer's possession sometimes may be met only by extensive
compilations of employer's records.
138. 47 C.F.R. 8 1.246 (1976).
139. 46 C.F.R. 8 502.208 (1976).
140. 16 C.F.R. 8 3.31 (1976).
141. 49 C.F.R. 8 1100.63 (1976).
AND REPORTS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE
142. 1.RECOMMENDATIONS
UNITEDSTATES
632 (1971).
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adopted without major modification because it is an effective,
proven method for implementing this portion of discovery. As
with written interrogatories, admissions should be allowed to be
requested from the General Counsel.ld3
Another discovery tool permitted by the federal rules is the
physical or mental examination. No major agency has adopted a
rule allowing this discovery device, and arguments against its
adoption by the NLRB exist. Primarily, those arguments emphasize the possibility of abuse. Nevertheless, there are occasions in
labor relations when a party has a legitimate need to inquire
about the physical or mental condition of a party or a person in
a party's control, as with an employer's concern with the health
of an employee or former employee. In such situations, and upon
good cause shown, the administrative law judge should be able
to order the examination sought. Rule 35 appears to safeguard
adequately the privacy rights of the person sought to be examined
while recognizing that circumstances may warrant examinations
and should, therefore, be adopted by the Board.
Rule 34 authorizes discovery through requests for production
of documents and things and for entry upon land. Rule 34 applies
only to discovery between parties; production of documents or
things in the possession of a nonparty apparently may be obtained only by serving notice to take the nonparty's deposition
and then securing a subpoena duces tecum designating the documents or things to be produced.ld4The relevant portion of the
Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation is similar in major respects to Rule 34.1d5The NLRB should adopt Rule
34 because of its reasoned approach to the problems in this area.
However, because of common employer resistance to union requests to come onto an employer's land to conduct time studies,
to organize or inform employees, or to audit or examine the employer's books or records, any rule adopted by the NLRB permitting entry could, for example, provide for entry by disinterested
third parties rather than by the requesting partyl4"nd for the
enforcement of express contract terms authorizing entry."'
143. See 1 C.F.R. O 305.70-4(5)(b) (1976).
144. Compare FED.R. CIV.P. 34 with FED.R. CN. P. 45(b).
145. Compare 1 C.F.R. 6 305.70-4(6) (1976) with FED.R. CN. P. 34.
146. See Metlox Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 378 F.2d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 1967); Arthur A.
Borchert, 90 N.L.R.B. 944, 953 (1950), modified and enforced per curium, 188 F.2d 474
(4th Cir. 1951). A unique condition imposed by the ICC rules is that entry is permitted
"subject to appropriate liability releases and safety and operating considerations." 49
C.F.R. 6 1100.66 (1976).
fl 8793 (1966) (Summers, Arb.).
147. See J.B. Lion Corp., 66-3 LAB.ARB. AWARDS
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4. Sanctions and their enforcement

Rule 37 specifies the sanctions that a court may impose on
parties or persons who fail to comply with discovery orders. Disobedience of an order compelling discovery may be penalized by
the following additional court orders: taking as established disputed matters of fact, striking parts or all of pleadings, staying
the proceeding, dismissing the action, rendering a default judgment, treating the failure to make discovery as contempt of court,
and awarding reasonable expenses caused by the fai1ure.l" Such
sanctions and orders compelling discovery are generally not appealable since they are inter10cutory.l~~
In fact, the effectiveness
of the federal discovery rules seems to lie in their nonappealability; the trial court's decision is effective because of its practical finality.
Although varying in specifics, the FMC,lWthe FTC,151and
the ICClS2discovery rules expressly delineate the sanctions that
may be imposed for failure to make discovery. These rules, patterned after Rule 37, provide that the administrative law judge
may make rulings that (1)imply that the information sought to
be discovered would have been adverse to the party, (2) take as
established the matters regarding which discovery was sought, (3)
block support or opposition to designated claims or defenses, (4)
prohibit introduction of designated matters in evidence, (5) disallow objections to the introduction and use of secondary evidence,
(6) strike part or all of a pleading, (7) stay the proceeding, (8)
dismiss the proceeding, or (9) render a decision against the party.
All of the sanctions authorized by the FMC, FTC, and ICC rules
seem appropriate for effective discovery in the administrative
context. Their obvious advantage is that they are enforceable by
the administrative law judge, the immediate overseer and arbiter
of administrative discovery, without resort to the courts. This
immediacy of enforcement and the limited appealability therefrom are necessary for the effective operation of discovery.
The Board should therefore adopt a sanction rule patterned
on both Rule 37 and the FMC, FTC, and ICC rules. The NLRB
rule should include a broad variety of possible sanctions. These
148. FED.R. CN. P. 37(b).
149. 8 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER,supra note 123,at 8 2006;Developments-Discoveiy,
supra note 3, at 992.
150. 46 C.F.R. 8 502.210 (1976).
151. 16 C.F.R. 8 3.38 (1976).
152. 49 C.F.R. 8 1100.67 (1976).
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sanctions should be enforceable by the administrative law judge,
and any appeal from his rulings should be carefully limited.

IV. CONCLUSION
Forceful arguments exist for and against discovery rules in

NLRB proceedings. The fears that expanded discovery will open
the doors to intrusion, increased expense, formalization, and
abuse are counterbalanced by the arguments that such discovery
will reduce surprise, encourage settlement, and put the parties on
more equal grounds, thus leading to fairer decisions. The resolution of these conflicting arguments depends on an examination of
the applicability of the rules proposed for adoption. In the case
of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such an analysis shows, for the most part, that those provisions with slight modifications should be effective in meeting
proper discovery needs in NLRB proceedings.

